Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 2

Spring 3-1-1961

The Cautionary Instruction On Income Taxes In Negligence
Actions
Norman C. Roettger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Tax Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Norman C. Roettger, The Cautionary Instruction On Income Taxes In Negligence Actions, 18
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1 (1961).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol18/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Washington and Lee Law Review
Member of the Southern Law Review Conference
Volume XVIII

Spring 1961

Number i

THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON INCOME
TAXES IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
NORMAN C. ROETTGER*

Although the potential for such cases has been in existence for
decades, there has been little, if any, activity in the courts until the
last decade with reference to giving an instruction upon the inapplicability of income taxes to verdicts rendered by juries in negligence cases. Now we have an epidemic of cases that have approached
the question from several different avenues and it appears inevitable
that this epidemic will continue unabated until it has affected the
dockets of every appellate jurisdiction in America. Because of the
manner in which some decisions have been reached, the epidemic
will no doubt continue until the law on this subject becomes harmonized among most of the states.
The statute giving life to this controversy is section 1o4(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which excludes from gross income
"the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) or
on account of personal injury or sickness." The exemption was
originally passed by Congress in 1918 and has continued in much its

same form to the present day.' In view of the long standing of this
statute on the books, it is surprising that the recent flurry of cases did
2
not occur some decades ago.

THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE

This discussion includes the question of whether or not the income
tax instruction should be given in negligence cases but it does not
*Associate, Fleming, O'Bryan and Fleming, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. B.A., 1952,
Ohio State University; LL.B., 1958, Washington and Lee University. Member,
Florida and Ohio Bars.
'Aforris & Nordstrom, infra note 46, at 274. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(5).
'An analogous situation has existed in England. See British Transp. Comm'n v.
Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185, 198 (1955)-
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include the question of whether damages are to be based on gross
earnings or net earnings.
Unfortunately, the courts have often failed to perceive the distinction between two related but distinct problems: one, whether
jurors should be instructed that income taxes are not to enter into
their deliberation on damages; and two, whether the correct measure
of damages when the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning power
should be based upon plaintiff's gross earnings or upon his net
earnings.3
The question of whether to give the income tax instruction in
negligence cases is a relatively simple matter; the question of whether, in cases where there has been any curtailment or a termination
of earning capacity, the measure of damages should be based upon
'The Supreme Court of Missouri made the distinction in Dempsey v. Thompson,
363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), but the distinction was soon lost in other decisions.
Although the two questions have been confused by many courts, perhaps the
most flagrant example is the case of Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d
555 (1956). In that case the Supreme Court of Indiana in a somewhat peculiar
appellate maneuver affirmed the opinion and decision of the Indiana Court of
Appeals, 126 Ind. App. 584, 131 N.E.2d 652 (1956), but wrote its own opinion
solely because the Court of Appeals had stated that the giving of the cautionary
instruction on income taxes was discretionary with the trial judge. Therefore, although the Court of Appeals found no reason for the trial court's disapproval of
the instruction offered by the defendant, it would not reverse the decision on that
basis. The Supreme Court of Indiana confused the two questions and specifically
set aside that portion of the intermediate court's opinion with this comment: "Inquiries at a trial into the incidents of taxation in damage suits of the character
we have here, would open up broad and new matters not pertinent to the issues
involved. Such subject matter would involve intricate instructions on tax and nontax liabilities with all the regulations pertinent thereto. No court could, with any
certainty, properly instruct a jury without a tax expert at its side." 134 N.E.2d 555,
556.
It is obvious that the cautionary instruction does not create new problems but
instead eliminates a very probable misconception and does so with remarkable
efficiency. On the other hand, the question of whether damages are to be based on
gross or net earnings has several serious attendant problems, such as those mistakenly envisioned by the Supreme Court of Indiana. Another case which shows
confusion of the two questions is Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F.
Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955). See also, Bracy v. Great No. Ry., 343 P.2d 848 (Mont.
1955), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 449 (sg6o).
The majority opinion in Maus v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281,
135 N.E.2d 253 (1956), appears to confuse the two questions; however, the concurring opinion (3 judges) indicates that a well-drawn cautionary instruction would be
acceptable in Ohio. In Cross v. Robert E. Lamb, Inc., 6o N.J. Super. 53, 158 A.2d
359 (1960), the defendant-appellant raised the ,luestion of the cautionary instruction
for the first time on appeal and therefore the court declined to review it. However,
from the cases cited in the opinion, it is apparent that the court was confusing the
two questions. Id. at 374.
The basic distinction between the two questions was made in a Comment, ii
Wash. :Lee L. Rev. 66 (1954); See also, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 636 (1957).
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gross earnings or upon net earnings is a highly complex one and be4
clouded by many factors.
The distinguished Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
recently handed down an opinion which dealt at length, and solely,
with both questions in McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. 5 The suit was a personal injury suit under F.E.L.A. and
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed
claiming that the trial court erred in denying ten different instructions requested by the defendant. Argument was held before three
judges and they unanimously agreed that there was no error in the
trial court's denial of eight of the ten charges. Of the two remaining instructions, one was an instruction to the jury that it should
not add any money to the amount of the verdict for income taxes
since the verdict is not taxable income to the plaintiff and the second
was to the effect that the jurors must calculate any past or future loss
of earnings on the basis of the plaintiff's net income after the deduction of income taxes. Because of the importance of these two instructions the case was referred to the court in banc.
The majority opinion first dealt with the questipn of whether
damages for loss of earnings are to be computed on the basis of gross
earnings or net earnings. On this particular question the court discussed some of the problems encountered in attempting to instruct
the jury how to arrive at a net, after-taxes, income. It concluded,
four judges to one, that in most cases instructing the jury on gross
earnings rather than net earnings is proper-primarily because it is
more practical. The court concluded further that there are some cases
when the potential verdict is quite large and a gross earnings instruction would produce an improper result, but suggested that the trial
'McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960). See also
Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959); Armentrout v. Virginian
Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. W. Va. 1947), reversed on other grounds, 166 F.2id 400
(4th Cir. 1948), for an indication of the computation possibly required by jurors.
To instruct on gross earnings presents an easier figure for the parties and the
court to use during the course of a trial and it eliminates the possibilities of tedious
instructions to the jury and expert testimony with reference to the effects of tax
upon the individual plaintiff's gross earnings. On the other hand, expert witnesses
have been successfully employed by courts in nearly every field of trial and the use
of a tax expert in this instance would not be any greater burden to jurors than is
the use of many of the expert witnesses utilized at the present time. Unfortunately,
the gross earnings figure gives a projection of damages inflated beyond the amount
necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his injury.
Some courts have approved the net earnings approach. O'Connor v. United
States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying Oklahoma law); Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 144 Conn. 659, x36 A.2d 918 (1957).
5282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 196o).
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judge can handle those cases by a net earnings instruction or by granting a new trial.
Then the court considered the question, which is before us in this
article, of whether the trial court should instruct the jury that it
should not add anything to the verdict on account of income taxes because the recovery is not taxable income to the plaintiff. The court decided, three judges to two, that it "was not error for the trial court to
refuse to give this instruction, but even the majority had this to say
about the instruction:
"Unlike Request No. 18 [on gross earnings], it [the cautionary
instruction] imposes no new burdens on the jury and there is
nothing speculative about it. Hence there would have been
no error in the court's giving the instruction. The question
before us is not that but whether the failure to give it was
error, and error so serious as to require a new trial."6
Chief Judge Lombard, who was joined by Judge Moore in his dissent on this point, would have reversed the judgment because the
trial judge did not charge the jury that any sum awarded was not subject to tax.
As far as this writer knows, Chief Judge Lombard's dissenting
opinion is the first opinion which would hold that a failure to instruct on this subject would be grounds for reversal. On the other
hand, there is only one reported case where the giving of the instruction has been held to be reversible error.7 All the other cases
have simply held that if the trial judge gave the instruction, that
was proper;8 or if he did not give the instruction, that was properly
within his discretion; 9 or, that it would have been proper for him to
have given the instruction, but it was not reversible error if he chose
not to do so. 10
HOW THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER

To GIVE

THE INCOME TAX INSTRUCTION ARISES

In most of the cases which have been presented to the appellate
courts for determination the trial court has refused to give the instruction that has been offered by the defendant. In many of the cases
'Id. at 39 (Emphasis added.)
"Wagner v. Iillinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
"Anderson v. United Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 196o); Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).

OSee cases discussed in Anderson v. United States Airlines, 183 F. Stupp. 97 (S.D.
Cal. ig6o).
2'McNVeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 196o); Atherley
v. McDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956).
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the instruction has been poorly drafted and the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's refusal to give the instruction has been based
upon the fact that the particular instruction offered* was improper
rather than because an instruction on the subject is improper." In
instances where the trial court has given the requested instruction
12
to the jury, appeals have been rare.
WHY THE PROBLEM ARISES

It seems more than obvious that the counsel for defendants in
negligence cases want to have an instruction given on income
taxes because of the fear that jurors erroneously believe that negligence awards are subject to Federal income taxation. It is equally
obvious that plaintiff's attorneys oppose the instruction because of a
feeling that jurors would not render as high a verdict as they would
without the instruction. 13 The legal principle which should be the
underlying one in these cases and which seems to be overlooked by
many courts in the heat generated by the intensive legal contest over
this question is simply: in the event the defendant is liable, the plaintiff's damages should be such that the plaintiff is made whole. 14 The
purpose is compensationl The development of the common law has
been towards achieving compensation, where due, by as efficient a
manner as possible. Therefore, the courts are vigilant in negligence
cases against attempts by either party to becloud the issue by interjecting bias, prejudice, passion, sympathy, or any other emotion or
misconception which should not be present in the mind of a juror
when he deliberates. If jurors have a misconception about income
taxes which may very well affect their deliberations on the question
of damages, it is consistent with the development of our jurisprudence
that such a misconception should be erased by a simple instruction
nMaus v. New York, C & St. L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956);
Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959).
"An instruction had been given in the case of Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Buckles,
232 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956), but the defendant was appealing and plaintiff did not cross-appeal on this particular question. Therefore, the
appellate court did not have the question of the propriety of giving the income
tax instruction before it. Also, see Kozitko v. City of Cleveland, as discussed in note
57 infra. But cf. Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., note 48 infra and accompanying text,
which is the only reported appeal assigning the giving of the instruction as error.
"'his candid conclusion was expressed by Judge Tolin in Anderson v. United
Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D. Cal. 196o).
24Restatement, Torts § 901 (1939). As stated by the House of Lords in British
Tramp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185 (1955); "Damages which have to be
paid for personal injuries are not punitive, still less are they a reward. They are
simply compensation...." Id. at 2o8.
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and thereby bring the courts closer to achieving compensation in a
more accurate manner for a party entitled to receive it.
At this stage in the development of income tax law when the
general practitioner can no longer cope with the series of constant
changes, distinctions, and developments which cascade forth from
the Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service and the courts
in matters of income tax, only the most naive individuals could believe that the average juror-nay, that any juror-knows that personal
injury or negligence awards are not subject to Federal income taxation.
Perhaps the only avenue other than naivet6 whereby one can arrive
at the conclusion that the average juror knows of section 104 of the
Internal Revenue Code is to follow dogmatically the fiction that every
man is presumed to know the law. This fiction is so clearly inapplicable in this question of whether juries should receive a cautionary instruction on this subject that it merits no further comment.
One of the judges of the Supreme Court of Ohio remarked during oral argument of a case that during his tenure as a Common Pleas
judge five jury foremen asked this specific question about taxability
of verdicts.15 In a recent Kansas case,' 6 the jury during its deliberations specifically inquired of the trial court whether or not the verdict
was taxable.
To consider the matter from a purely practical
point of view, it is
obvious that, since the institution of withholding taxes according to
the late Mr. Rum's plan, nearly every American is quite conscious
that the Federal Government exacts its due from each and every
dime that anyone receives in the form of wages and on most other
transactions. The impact of income taxes and how it has pervaded
almost all corners of our life is apparent to the average citizen. For
example, if he turns to the world of television, he no doubt remembers that the once popular $64,000 Question program produced a number of contestants who were reluctant to risk the hazard of obtaining an
additional $32,ooo because the "tax bite" made the hazard too
great-and this discussion was carried on 'at some length in the newspapers during the initial excitement of this program.17 John Doe,
"See the comments of counsel at such oral argument in: Knachel, Jury Instructions on Tax Exemption in Personal Injury Cases, 6 Clev.-Mar. L Rev. 71 (1957).
See also, Morris, Should Juries in Personal Injury Cases be Instructed that Plaintiffs
Recoveries are not Income Within the Meaning of Federal Tax Law?, 3 Defense L.J.
3 (1958).
"Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (196o). See
Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.V.2d 627 (1944).
2-A similar observation was made by Chief Judge Lombard in his dissenting
opinion in McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (1960).

CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS

i96i]

sports fan, is also aware of the fact that heavyweight prize fighters
usually have only one fight per year at the championship level because any additional fights would be virtually for the benefit of Uncle
Sam. He also notices comparisons between the total salaries of some
of today's baseball stars and those of yesteryear with the usual sportspage comment that, although today's salaries may be larger, the
net take-home pay is smaller than that earned by previous baseball
greats.
The number of tax-paying Americans has increased steadily and
most adults either file income tax returns or are taxpayers through
the medium of joint returns.' s There is every reason, therefore, to
expect that the average citizen, when he is impaneled as a juror in
a negligence case, is acutely aware of the impact of income taxes
but has not the foggiest notion that negligence awards are not
taxable as income to the recipient. He is likely to have a foggy notion,
however, that the "tax bite" gets progressively larger as the amount
increases and that it reaches rather dramatic proportions at higher
levels. He might well realize-albeit in rough and hazy figures in his
mind-that in order for the average married American to get a net
after-taxes sum of $20,000, he needs a total amount of about $29,000;
and to obtain $40,000, the total amount must be $78,000 and to obtain the sum of $65,000, the total amount has increased to $200,000.
Therefore, the defendant in a negligence case has a legitimate
concern, especially where the amount of damages sought is quite
large, that the jury-through no fault of its own and because its
normal misconception has not been properly removed through a
cautionary instruction-may impose upon him a verdict far in excess of what the jury, if it had known the true state of the law,
would have determined to be compensation for the plaintiff's injury.
Is

THE PROBLEM ONE OF FORM OR CONTENT?

The appellate courts to which this question has been directed
have reached widely divergent views. Several courts have approved the
giving of the income tax instruction. 19 In the usual instance where
the trial court refuses to give the instruction offered by defendant
the courts have often affirmed the trial court's refusal to give the instruction with very little explanation other than they felt it was
"For example, nearly 6o million tax returns were filed in 1957. 196o World Almanac, p. 755-

'-Anderson v. United Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 196o); Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 SAV.2d 42 (1952).
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within the discretion of the trial court,20 or the giving of an instruction on this subject in any form has been rejected. 21 The Supreme
Courts of Ohio and Wisconsin have indicated that a properly drafted
instruction could be given but that the trial court was correct in
refusing the instruction offered to it at the trial. 22 In California it has
been held that the instruction offered by the defendant was proper but
that the trial court was acting within its discretion in refusing to give
it although that court would have been equally correct to have
23
given the instruction.
A review of the cases which have elaborated on the problem has
led this writer to believe that the problem is basically one of form
rather than content because the content of the instruction is a proper one to present to the jury when it is properly drafted as a cautionary instruction.
WHY THE INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE

GIvEN

The leading early case in America which approached the problem from a practical standpoint was that of Dempsey v. Thompson 24
in which the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed its previous position
on this question and, while affirming the judgment for the plaintiff
with a remittitur, set forth an instruction properly to be charged by
the trial court. 25 The conclusion of the Supreme Court of Missouri
was preceded by a lucid and realistic approach to this problem of
the probable misconception on the part of the juror about the tax
effects of personal injury or wrongful death awards:
"Can there be any sound reason for not so instructing the
jury? We can think of none. Surely, the plaintiff has no right
to receive an enhanced award due to a possible and, we think
probable misconception on the part of a jury that the amount
allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes. Such an instruction would at once and for all purposes take the subject of
income taxes out of the case." 26
A careful analysis and well-reasoned decision appeared recently in
20See conclusion and discussion in Anderson v. United Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
2Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 I11.
App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
'Maus v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956);
Behringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959).
'Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298
P.2d 7oo (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
2'363 Mo. 336, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
zSee note 53 infra and accompanying text.
251 S.W.2d at 45.
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Anderson v. United Airlines. 27 This suit resulted from the collision between an airplane of United Airlines and one of Trans-World Airlines
over the Grand Canyon several years ago. Regardless of the newsworthy
aspects of the case, the reasoning of the judge is so lucid that it is
commended as the best analysis of this particular problem of whether
to give the income tax instruction which has appeared in any decision to date. The trial court wrote the opinion in Anderson solely
to give its reasons for ruling that the instruction offered by the defendant would be given to the jury. He concludes that the weight of
authority indicates it is a matter of discretion of the trial court and
that no good reason for not giving it has been suggested. He also
points out that there is only one reported appellate decision which
directly holds that giving of such instruction is error. The one decision referred to was an Illinois case 28 spawned of the rather sweeping obiter dictum contained in the previous Illinois case of Hall v.
9
Chicago & Northwestern Ry.2
Several of the early cases which affirmed the trial court's refusal to
give an instruction on the exemption of personal injury verdicts from
income tax rely on a statement in the case of Stokes v. United
States.3 0 However, the Stokes case was not concerned with the giving
or refusing of the cautionary income tax instruction but was instead
dealing with the second problem of whether gross earnings or net
earnings were to be considered in making an award for damages. As
we have seen from the McWeeney case, 31 even that question was
rather lightly argued in the Stokes case and just as lightly treated by
32

the court.

The instruction, when properly drafted, should be given because
it correctly states an important item of substantive law that jurors are
unlikely to be aware of and because, as a cautionary instruction
"183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 196).
2Vagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E. 2d 771 (1955).
'5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
'0144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
31282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 196o).
nIt is pointed out that the question received only casual treatment in the
briefs and was disposed of in one brief sentence in the Stokes case. 282 F.2d 34, 42
(2d Cir. 1960). Although the language in McWeeney indicated that the Stokes decision
on gross earning was still adhered to in cases where Federal law was applicable or
where the State law was silent, the Second Circuit had applied Oklahoma law in
the case of O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959), and decided that
net earnings were the proper measure of damages. The court rejected the contention
of the plaintiff that federal income taxes might be discontinued or reduced in the
future. Id. at 584. Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. i96o) expressly follows the rule of O'Connor with this terse comment: "realities must prevail." Id. at 614.
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which directs that they not consider the question of income taxes in
arriving at their verdict, it diminishes rather than adds to the number of subjects they are to consider.
Some critics of the instruction have claimed the instruction assumes the jury will not follow the other instruction given on the
matter of damages; 33 to the contrary, it does not indulge in such
an assumption but is given merely as further assistance to the jury.
Many instructions fall into this category of directing jurors not to
consider certain matters in arriving at their verdict. As an example,
a specific instruction cautioning jurors not to allow sympathy to enter
into the consideration of the verdict should be given in Florida courts
and it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse it.3 4 In view of the
large number of cautionary instructions found in compilations of
approved jury instruction, it seems that the Florida instruction cautioning jurors not to be influenced by sympathy *is not atypical of instructions of a similar vein given in other jurisdictions. 35 Every trial
court is familiar with cautionary instructions such as ones instructing
the jury not to add to the verdict in order to penalize the defendant,
and cautioning them not to arrive at their verdict or determine liability by the use of hindsight.

THE BRITISH COURTS HAVE REvERsED THEIR POSITION
AND

Now LEND

SUPPORT TO THE GIVING

OF THE INcOME TAX INSTRUCTION

Of course the vast difference between the British method of handling litigation in negligence matters and that employed in American
courts makes the British decisions helpful largely for the approach
involved. It is significant that the British courts have now come to
grips with the realities of income taxes in personal injury awards
and do not permit a plaintiff to recover more than is necessary for
just compensation.
In the case of Billingham v. Hughes, 36 the court reviewed sev-

eral British lower court decisions on the subject and rejected defendant's claim that taxes should be taken into consideration in
assessing damages. 37 The Billingham case was cited in some American
'3Hall v. Chicago &Northwestern Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
"'Loftin v. Skelton, 152 Fla. 437, 12 So. 2d 175 (1943).
'See note 46 infra.
[1949] 1 K.B. 643, 1 All E.R. 684.
'The question was not raised in British Courts until 1933 when Fairholme v.
Firth & Browne, Ltd. [1933] 149 L.T. 332 (K.B.), held that taxes were not to enter into
the consideration of the amount of damages. The basis of the decision seems to have

1961]
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cases in the early 1950's3 8 which declined to give the instruction

offered by the defendant.
In the personal injury case of British Transport Co.mm'n v. Gourley,3 9 Britain's highest court, the House of Lords, reviewed Billingham and the prior British cases and held that the trial judge was
wrong in following Billingham v. Hughes. The court concluded that
"to ignore the tax element at the present day would be to act in a
manner which is out of touch with reality."

40

Perhaps the action of the House of Lords in Britain in looking to
the principle of compensation will foretell a similar trend in American courts.
THE RULE AGAINST GIVING THE INSTRUCTION

Is

ERRONEOUS

The leading case for the proposition that jurors should not be
informed in any way on the applicability of income taxes to per41
sonal injury awards is that of Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
The language contained in the Hall case is sweeping and the error of
its content is all the more apparent when one realizes that it is obiter
dictum. 42 Examination of the Hall case shows only that the Illinois

been the principle of res inter alios acta. Two Courts of Session in Scotland reached
opposite results: McDaid v. Trustees of the Clyde Navigation, [1946] Sess. Cas. 462,
held that damages should take taxes into consideration; Blackwood v. Andre, [1947]
Sess. Cas. 333, reached the opposite conclusion and supported the gross earnings
view.
*For example, Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D.
Iowa 1955).
'1956] A.C. 185 (1955).
'l0 d. at 203. Although this bears on the question of whether the measure of
damages is gross earnings or net earnings, the usual theory advanced by the gross
earnings proponents that taxes are difficult to evaluate was rejected in the inimitable
British manner by the court as follows: "It is impossible to assess with mathematical
accuracy that reduction should be made by reason of the tax position, just as it is
impossible to assess with mathematical accuracy the amount of damages which
should be awarded for the injury itself and for the pain and suffering endured."
Id. at 203-04. The only dissenting judge in the Gourley case had written the opinion
in Blackwood v. Andre, note 37 supra, and refused to reverse his previous position.
415 II.
2d. 135, 125 N.E.2d. 77 (1955), reversing 349 I11.
App. 175, 11o N.E.2d 654
(1953). Among the decisions which have apparently agreed with Hall v. R.R., see
Mitchell v. Emblade, 8o Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d iM34 (1956) (dictum); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1958) (dictum; the court incredibly rejected defendant's contention as "a novel assertion" but reversed on other grounds);
Missouri-K.-T. R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956).
'-Anderson v. United Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
The court in Hall v. R.R. completely lost sight of the principle that the purpose is compensation to the plaintiff for his injury when it reached its conclusion
by discussing whether a jury should know that the railroad's profits are affected by a
judgment and this, in turn, affects fares, etc. 125 N.E.2d 77, 86: Quaere: (i) What
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court was affirming the right of the 'trial court to grant a new trial
under the particular circumstances. The sweeping and erroneous
remarks contained in the opinion of the Hall case were neither necessary to the decision of the case nor well founded on law and ex43
perience.
A number of reasons have been introduced by various courts and
in the arguments of various counsel in an effort to support the refusal to give such an instruction. It is not the purpose of this article
to compile a listing of the arguments used in opposition to the giving of this instruction but some of the ones more commonly employed can be discussed briefly:
i. The instruction introduces new elements into the case. Quite
to the contrary, the instruction does not introduce a new element
to the jurors that has not been there but rather it dispels a possible
and, from what we have seen and surely know, actual element which
does exist with jurors.
2. The instruction assumes that the jurors will not follow the
other instruction on damages given by the judge. This instruction
does not run at counter purposes with the assumption that jurors
do follow the court's charge on damages. Rather, it tends to supplement the court's charge by giving the jurors additional information
and guideposts which are necessary to arrive at the damages correctly in a personal injury or wrongful death case.
Obviously; it is not error for a trial court to give the jury an instruction that it is not to be influenced by sympathy or an unfair
motive. Such instructions are not given because the court indulges
the assumption that the jury will not follow its other instructions
and its charge on damages but merely to aid the jury in discharging
its duty.
3. If the instruction is given, the court should also charge the
jury that the plaintiff will have to pay attorney fees out of any verdict rendered.
bearing does this have on the question of what amount properly compensates the
plaintiff? and (2) How does such reasoning apply to an average individual defendant?
1"The court in the Hall case came up with the following curious conclusion: "It
may he conceded that the possibility of harm exists if the jury is left uninformed
on this matter; on the other hand, it is conceivable that the plaintiff could be prejudiced if they were told of this law." 125 N.E.2d 77, 85.
For a sharp criticism of the Hall opinion in a step-by-step analysis, see Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 98 (1957). See also, Comment, 59 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1957)- It is
interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Illinois' opinion in Hall v. R.R. was
not received enthusiastically in Illinois periodicals. Comments, 33 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 377 (1955); 43 Ill. B.J. 81o (1955). The Court of Appeals decision was the subject of a Comment, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 156 (953).
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It seems incredible that this argument could be made in an
American court but it has been proposed and it was apparently accepted by the Illinois court in the Hall case.4 4 This contention is so
45
groundless that it may be disposed of without further comment.
4. The instruction is "cautionary" in nature.
Far from being a valid criticism of a well-drafted income tax instruction, the fact that it is cautionary is the reason it should be given
to the jury. We have noted previously that cautionary instructions
are given in nearly every jury trial.4 6
As was pointed out by the trial court in Anderson v. United Airlines,47 the only case in America which has held that it was reversible error to give an instruction on income taxes is the case of
Wagner v. Illinois Central R.R. s The case history of Wagner v. Illinois Central reveals the inherent error in refusing to instruct propperly with regard to the nonapplicability of income taxes to negligence
awards. In Wagner the plaintiff was a railroad conductor who sued for
damages under F.E.L.A. and the first trial resulted in a verdict and
judgment for $13o,ooo. The trial judge granted a new trial on the
grounds of error in the instructions. The second trial resulted in a
verdict and judgment for only $8o,ooo and in this second trial the
court gave an instruction which informed the jury of the tax-exempt
nature of any award. Before the appeal of the second Wagner trial,
the Supreme Court of Illinois decided the Hall case, embodying the
dictum that a cautionary instruction is improper. As a result, the
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the $8o,ooo judgment in Wagner
49
and remanded it for a new trial "on this basis alone."
The Wagner case presents this unusual spectacle: a plaintiff has
received a judgment for $8o,ooo but on the assumption that if he could
have a new trial without an income tax instruction which gave
the jury the true status of the Federal income tax law, he could get
"125 N.E.2d 77, 86. In Bracy v. Great No. Ry., 343 P.2d 848 (Mont. 1959), the
trial court quite properly refused such an instruction when the defendant requested
the trial court to instruct both that the plaintiff would not have to pay taxes on
any verdict and further that the jury was not permitted to include any court costs
or attorney's fees in the verdict.
"Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211 (1872).
"For a statistical discussion of this subject, see Morris & Nordstrom, Personal
Injury Recovery and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 275 (1960),
where it is pointed out that, in relation to the total number of instructions, the
percentage of instructions of a cautionary nature were 62% in the compilations of
instructions for California and 39% in a compilation made by Randall.
'183 F. Supp. at 98.
"7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
'129 N.E.2d at 772.
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a larger judgment-probably $13o,ooo-even though it must be conceded the plaintiff is not entitled to more than the $8oooo awarded
under that instruction.5 0
If the cautionary instruction is not employed, even the severest
critics of giving the instruction acknowledge that injustice may well
occur to the defendant.5 1 Further, the giving of a properly drafted
cautionary instruction does not violate any principle of trial procedure but instead it effectuates the purpose of our courts to give
redress to aggrieved parties in a fair and impartial manner. The
plaintiff's purpose in seeking damages in negligence cases is to be
made "whole"; therefore, since the plaintiff is not entitled to any
additional amount because of the jury's misconception about income taxation and personal injury verdicts, the plaintiff cannot
be harmed by the giving of the cautionary instruction. In effect,
the giving of the instruction insures that the plaintiff will receive
what he has been seeking: a more adequate award.
THE FORM

To

BE EMPLOYED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY

Two different instructions have been specifically approved in
reported decisions5 2 and it is significant that in each instance the
instruction carefully explains the inapplicability of income taxation
to negligence awards and directs the jury not to consider it in arriving
at its verdict.
The instruction proposed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in
Dempsey v. Thompson is as follows:
"You are instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if any award is made, is not subject to Federal
or State income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes
in fixing the amount of any award made plaintiff, if any you
make." 53
Missouri requires strict compliance with this form and has approved
the trial court's refusal to give a variation of this form which failed
to instruct the jury not to consider taxes in its determination.54 The
other instruction was given by the trial court in Anderson v. United
Airlines:
*wAccording to correspondence with counsel in the case, the third trial resulted
in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $107,625.
51
See note 43 supra.
52
Anderson v. United Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).

S.W.2d at 45.
"Bowyer v. Te-co, Inc., 3so S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1958).

53251
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"You are instructed as a matter of law, that any award made
to the plaintiff in this case is not income to the plaintiff within the meaning of the Federal Income Tax Law. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages. You are to follow the instructions already given by this court in measuring those damages
and in no event should you either add to or substract from
that award on account of Federal income taxes. 55
The exact form of another instruction is available to us through a
periodical and it is interesting to note that the instruction was given
in Ohio, subsequent to the Maus case; 56 unfortunately, there was no
57
appeal from the judgment in the lower court.

When we examine the two instructions which courts have approved, it becomes obvious why several courts have affirmed the trial
court's refusal to give the particular instruction offered in that case
although the same court has stated that a well-drafted instruction
could be properly given. Consider for example the following instructions:
"You are further instructed that in determining the amount
of damages for personal injuries you are not to add to or include
in the award of damages anything to compensate the plaintiff
for Federal or state income taxes, since any damages recovered
as an award for personal injuries are not subject to'58and therefore are free of either Federal or state income taxes.
And:
"I charge you as a matter of law that by virtue of the Internal
Revenue Act of 1954, any amount received by the plaintiff as
compensation for personal injuries is exempt from Federal income taxation, and you must take this fact in consideration
in arriving at the amount of your verdict in this case."' 59
In each of these instructions we do not see the trial court explaining
the inapplicability of income taxes as to the verdict and then cautioning the jury not to consider them in arriving at their determination.
z183 F. Supp. 97. (Liability had been determined at an earlier trial). This form
was suggested in Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 46, at 276.
5
1Maus v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956). For
the form of the instruction see Morris, supra note 15, at 3.
r'£he instruction was given by Judge Artl of the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County in the case of Kozitko v. City of Cleveland, case 658,519. The
jury trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $2o,OO and no
appeal was taken, according to information obtained by this writer.
mBehringer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249,
54 (1959)'Maus v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253, 254
(1956). The trial court's refusal to give a better but still inadequate instruction was
affirmed in New York Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1958).
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Of course, a properly drafted cautionary instruction will be refused by the trial court when it improperly adds a provision that the
jury is not to add anything to its verdict for court costs or attorneys
60
fees.
It seems that either of the two approved instructions sufficiently
eliminates any possible misconception the jury might have and yet
grants protection to both the plaintiff and the defendant in a negligence action. There seems little to indicate a choice between the two
although the instruction given in the Anderson case would seem to
comply with the prescribed limits set forth by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin 6 ' and may possibly be preferable because of its insistence
that this instruction shall not affect the computation of damages
under the other instructions given in the charge.
It must be admitted that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did
not object to the form of the instruction offered by the defendant
in the McWeeney case, even though the instruction offered did not
direct the jury not to consider the question of income taxes.6 2 As has
been previously noted,6 the court agreed that the instruction would
have been proper as given but only disagreed on whether or not it was
reversible error to refuse to give the instruction. Perhaps this is an indication that, as American courts make the distinction between the
two questions and thereby appreciate the value and efficiency of
giving the cautionary instruction, the matter of form will become less
important.
In any event, the confusion which marked the earlier decisions
in this field seems to be diminishing. As courts recognize that there are
two distinct problems, and further recognize that the problems hinging upon the question of whether to compute damages on gross or
net earnings simply do not plague courts in the mere giving of a
cautionary instruction, the confusion should be dispelled. Giving the
cautionary instruction-in form similar to two discussed in this
article 64-presents no problems to the court but gives the juries better
tools with which to arrive at their verdict; at the same time it protects the defendant from possible misconceptions as well as assuring
plaintiff that an award he receives is based upon proper compensation. It is rare that a simple and effective device such as this cautionary instruction presents itself and the courts should readily employ it
in negligence trials.
wBracy v. Great No. Ry., 343 P.2d 848, 853 (Mont. 1959).
95 N.W.2d at 254.
"282 F.2d at 39.
"3See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 53 and 55 supra and accompanying text.

